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The purpose of this study was to understand if dual tasking and visual binding share a 
similar cognitive architecture. Here, it was hypothesised that the binding process would 
alleviate the executive demands associated with dual tasking, and consequently reduce 
the dual task cost (i.e., the reduction in task accuracy). Participants were asked to 
remember object and colour information concurrently. In the control condition, objects 
and colours were not related, but the “typical” condition used objects and colours that 
were found to be reliably associated, and would therefore be likely to reflect hardwired 
bindings in long term memory. There was no significant difference between the dual 
task cost for each condition, but some participants clearly benefited from the presence 
of associated colours and objects. Furthermore, this benefit was predicted by a 
participants’ verbal span and vividness of visual imagery. However, it is unclear whether 
the benefit is attributable to associative priming or visual binding, impeding any 
implications for the relationship between dual tasking and visual binding. As such, 
future directions are discussed that could hopefully delineate the cause of the benefit in 
the typical dual task condition. In spite of this ambiguity, the data nonetheless revealed 
ways in which dual task cost can be reduced; this in turn carries implications for the 










Dual tasking and visual binding, like most cognitive processes, are studied separately. 
However, their recent impact in the neuropsychological literature has raised some 
telling parallels between them. The overarching assumption of this study is that these 
processes are somehow related, and could potentially reflect a shared form of 
processing in spite of their evident differences. In approaching this possibility, these 
processes could be potentially be revised in terms of a more general cognitive 
architecture which could in turn produce a different way of explaining these processes 
and their absence in disease. 
 
The first section of the introduction is a description of these processes with reference to 
Baddeley’s revised model of working memory (2000). This is to define and highlight the 
main difference between them. Specifically, dual tasking is argued to require additional 
executive effort and attentional resources whereas visual binding is depicted as an 
automatic process. The second section is a review of dual tasking and visual binding in 
ageing and disease. Here, the similar conclusions drawn from each set of literature are 
discussed along with the implications such conclusions have for the processes. 
Specifically, these similarities imply that dual tasking and visual binding use information 
in a conceptually similar way. The last section outlines hypotheses that can be used to 
test this implication, and is followed by a discussion of the experiment’s methodology.   
 
Dual tasking and executive control 
Dual tasking is the process of performing two tasks simultaneously, such as 
remembering visual and verbal information at the same time, or cooking and having a 
conversation. The need for focus and attention is clear from our subjective experiences, 
and is also outlined in detail in neuropsychological literature. Here, dual tasking is 
thought to depend on an additional, executive function (Miyake et al., 2000) that can 
allocate attentional resources to the tasks. Specifically, this function is thought to be 
carried out by the central executive of Baddeley’s model of working memory (2000, see 
Figure 1). The central executive is based on Norman and Shallice’s (1986) supervisory 
attentional system (SAS), and is an executive system dedicated to focusing, dividing and 
switching an individual’s attention (Baddeley, 2002). In a dual task (e.g., remembering 








Figure 1: Baddeley’s (2000) multi-component model of working memory. Areas in white 
represent fluid systems that exist in working memory, and areas in grey represent 
crystallised systems in long term memory.  
 
The need for a central executive is highlighted by studies of DAT patients. Baddeley, 
Logie, Bressi, Della Sala and Spinnler (1986) observed that DAT patients who performed 
a primary visual tracking task and secondary verbal task demonstrated a significantly 
larger decrease in the secondary task than controls. Importantly, the authors noted that 
this dual task impairment was observed when both tasks were calibrated to the 
participants’ maximum level of performance. Here, the tracking task and one of the 
verbal tasks (recalling a string of digits) were performed beforehand by the participants, 
and the highest level of performance that did not incur a significant amount of errors 
was taken as their maximum capacity. Therefore, all participants experienced the dual 
task under the same relative load; they were all performing at maximum capacity. By 
replicating of the deficit after calibrating the dual task, the authors interpreted the 
impairment as an inability to co-ordinate attention rather than finding the component 
tasks more difficult than controls.  
 
Replications of these results through different dual tasks (Della Sala, Baddeley, Papagno 
& Spinnler, 1995) and manipulations of component task difficulty (Logie, Cocchini, Della 
Sala & Baddeley, 2004) are consistent with this interpretation of dual tasking. Evidence 
from neuroimaging also suggests dual tasking depends on executive resources. 
D’Esposito et al. (1995) observed dual task specific activation of the prefrontal cortex, 




induces stronger (but not novel) activations for areas involved in the component task 
performance, including frontal areas presumed to underlie executive functioning 
(Adcock, Constable, Gore & Goldman-Rakic, 2000; Bunge et al., 2000; Collette & Van der 
Linden, 2002). Overall, it is clear that dual tasking bears heavily on executive resources.  
 
Similarly, dual tasking also depends on the amount of attention a person can give to the 
component tasks; this is distinct from the central executive impairment noted in DAT. 
Azouvi et al. (2004) observed that patients with a severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) 
demonstrated a dual task impairment when performing a random generation task and 
reaction time task concurrently. Although controls and TBI patients experienced longer 
latencies on a primary reaction time task in a dual task situation, the effect was 
significantly larger in patients. In spite of this deficit, patients were still able to divide 
and allocate attention strategically between tasks if they were instructed to do so. 
Although patients’ overall performance was poorer than controls, the pattern of 
performance across different instructions for patients and controls was comparable. The 
authors concluded that the TBI patients’ dual task impairments were “related to a 
reduction in available processing resources rather than an impairment of strategic 
processes responsible for attentional allocation and switching between tasks” (Azouvi et 
al., 2004, p. 1266).  
 
In sum, dual tasking requires significant cognitive effort; it demands executive resources 
and depends on sufficient attentional resources. In contrast, visual binding requires 
neither the central executive nor attention. It requires much less cognitive effort, and 
occurs automatically.  
 
The automaticity of visual binding 
Visual binding integrates visual information to form a single representation or unit 
(Brockmole & Franconeri, 2009). For instance, shape and colour information that is 
initially unrelated can be bound together to give a representation of a shape with that 
colour. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that this process occurs automatically. For instance, Allen, 
Baddeley and Hitch (2006) employed dual task methodology to investigate the 
attentional demands of binding. Here, the degree to which a process is disrupted by an 
additional task indexes the amount of cognitive resources it usually requires. They 




bindings, but the reduction in memory for these features and bindings was comparable. 
This suggested that binding did not require more resources than those used in the 
retaining feature information in memory. Similarly, Gajewski and Brockmole (2006) 
demonstrated that participants were as likely to remember bindings as they were to 
remember single features after attention was diverted by invalid exogenous cues. 
Recently, Allen, Hitch and Baddeley (2009) demonstrated that the phenomena reported 
in Allen et al. (2006) persists for information presented cross modally (e.g., verbal 
colour information and visual shape information) and in the presence of demanding 
dual tasks. Furthermore, this binding occurs when the features are both separated 
across time and visual space (Karlsen, Allen, Baddeley & Hitch, 2010). These findings 
indicate that attention is not necessary for visual binding to occur, nor is it restricted to 
one modality or timeframe. It is therefore an automatic, implicit process. In these 
instances, bound information is presumed to exist in the episodic buffer of working 
memory (Baddeley, 2000). This component of the model (illustrated in Figure 1) is a 
passive, store of multimodal information. It can integrate information from the 
visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop, but can also receive episodic, 
multimodal information from long term memory. Information is retrieved from the 
buffer with the central executive and attention.  This has been supported by evidence 
that memory for bindings is affected by the distraction of attention during recall (Brown 
& Brockmole, 2010). As such, whilst bindings can occur passively and implicitly, they are 
only consciously perceived through the use of attention (as posited by Allen et al. 2009).  
 
However, whilst bindings are created automatically, their maintenance and availability 
varies with respect to what these bindings represent.  Using terminology from 
VanRullen (2009), hardwired bindings reflect combinations of features that have been 
learned through exposure to real, natural objects. For instance, the shape of a leaf and 
the colour green are represented as a bound entity in long term memory as a result of 
repeatedly co-occurring. Conversely, arbitrary bindings reflect a new or meaningless 
combination of features, such as a blue circle, or red hexagon.  Hardwired and arbitrary 
binding are also referred to as conjunction detection and ad-hoc binding, respectively 
(Hommel & Colzato, 2009).  
 
The maintenance of arbitrary bindings depends on attention. Specifically, if bindings are 
formed and additional visual information is presented and attended to, individuals show 
poor memory for the original bindings. For instance, Allen et al. (2006) observed 




sequentially rather than simultaneously. Similarly, Logie, Brockmole and 
Vandenbroucke (2009) demonstrated that bindings were only retained across a series 
of trials if no interfering bindings were presented in between repeated trials. Lastly, 
Fougnie and Marois (2009) employed a dual task scenario to investigate the fragility of 
bindings. Here, participants completed a multiple object tracking (MOT) task after 
forming bindings. Here, participants followed target items move across a screen and 
were then asked to decide whether a probed item was a target. This caused a significant 
impairment for binding memory, but, interestingly, this effect was attenuated when the 
MOT task was stationary. This suggests that the bindings are more sensitive to 
interrupting bound visual information (i.e., object and motion information) than to 
single feature information (i.e., object information).  
 
How can these findings be reconciled with Allen et al. (2006), who did not observe any 
effect of a dual task on binding memory? Critically, Allen et al. used distractor tasks that 
loaded on verbal – not visual - working memory. In doing so, they avoided introducing a 
bottleneck in visual processing, unlike the authors noted above. Hence, the maintenance 
of arbitrary bindings are jeopardised if additional information loads on visual attention, 
moreso if the imposing information is complex.  This explains the apparently contrasting 
view presented by VanRullen (2009), who argued that arbitrary bindings could not be 
formed automatically. This claim was based on evidence that memory for arbitrary 
bindings can be impaired if attention is distracted by a secondary task (e.g., Fei-Fei et al., 
2005). However, in light of the evidence reviewed here, VanRullen’s argument appears 
to conflate the production of arbitrary bindings with their maintenance and fragility.   
 
Conversely, the tenacity of hardwired bindings is different to arbitrary bindings. Two 
lines of evidence support this statement. Firstly, the introduction of competing visual 
information – that is hazardous to arbitrary bindings – does not appear to affect 
bindings for natural objects. For instance, Reddy, Reddy and Koch (2006) observed 
participants’ recognition memory for non-famous faces was equivalent for single (86%) 
and dual task (82%) situations, where the latter drew attention away from the faces and 
onto a letter discrimination task. Similarly, Fei-Fei, VanRullen, Koch and Perona (2005) 
found that this withdrawal of attention did not affect recognition memory for scenes, 
extending the evidence that the categorisation of natural scenes was also unaffected by a 





Secondly, the relationship between hardwired binding features appears to be stronger 
than those in arbitrary bindings. Colzato, Raffone and Hommel (2006) and Hommel and 
Colzato (2009) provided evidence for this using a priming paradigm. In this paradigm, 
participants viewed an object composed of two features (colour and shape), and were 
then presented with a test object that was either the same or different to the previous 
object. Participants indicated whether this object’s shape was the same as the shape of 
the previous object. Crucially, the test object could differ in two ways: a completely 
different object had a different colour and shape to the initial object, but a partially 
different object only differed on one feature. Importantly, a test object with a repeated 
colour - but different shape - produces a delayed response. This is interpreted as the 
repeated colour eliciting the prior bound object’s shape back into attention, which 
interferes with the current test information, subsequently delaying a participant’s 
response. Importantly, Hommel and Colzato (2009) observed that this delaying effect 
was seen for both arbitrary (geometric shape and colour) and hardwired (shapes of fruit 
and their prototypical colour) bindings, but the effect was significantly larger for the 
latter. This suggests that the relationship between features in hardwired bindings is 
stronger than that of arbitrary bindings, as the relationship between arbitrary bindings 
takes less time to overcome.  
 
In sum, hardwired bindings are more resilient than arbitrary bindings. With reference to 
Baddeley’s (2000) model of working memory, this difference can be explained in terms 
of connections to long term memory. Specifically, arbitrary bindings do not have any 
connection to long term memory. As such, they are automatically created and left in the 
episodic buffer, which is a passive store. Without attention, they are likely to be 
overwritten. However, hardwired bindings are automatically created, but “backed up” 
by visual semantics and prior learning; they are therefore more resilient. 
 
In summary, the following distinction between dual tasking and visual binding has been 
made: successful dual tasking depends on executive resources and attention, whereas 
visual bindings occur automatically. Furthermore, this implicit process of binding 
produces more resilient bindings if they reflect a learned association in long term 
memory. In spite of this distinction, a review of dual tasking and visual binding in ageing 







The similarities between dual tasking and visual binding 
Firstly, in spite of memory deficits associated with age, both processes are retained in 
ageing. Previously, dual tasking ability was though to deteriorate with age (e.g., 
Salthouse, Rogan & Prill, 1984). However, the negative effect of age is eliminated if the 
dual task is calibrated (as seen in Baddeley et al., 1986). Studies that do so find no 
significant effect of age for dual tasking across verbal memory and visual tracking tasks 
(Della Sala, Foley, Beschin, Allerhand & Logie, 2010; Foley, Kaschel, Logie & Della Sala, 
2011; Kaschel, Logie, Kazén & Della Sala, 2009) and also for verbal and visual memory 
tasks (MacPherson, Della Sala, Logie & Wilcock, 2007). An investigation from Logie, 
Della Sala, MacPherson and Cooper (2007) demonstrated that any effect of ageing on 
dual tasking is likely to result from a situation that places demands on working memory 
stores - that decrease with age (Bopp & Verhaegen, 2005) – rather than executive co-
ordination processes or strategies. Similarly, Brockmole, Parra, Della Sala and Logie 
(2008) observed that binding does not deteriorate with age in spite of reduced visual 
working memory capacity. Elderly participants demonstrated a significantly poorer 
memory for shapes than younger participants (Experiment 2), but, importantly, did not 
show any difference in free recall of binding or feature information. Furthermore, there 
is no interaction between this difference and age, suggesting that elderly participants 
bind information to the same level as healthy young participants.  
 
These findings are important for two reasons. Firstly, they demonstrate that these 
processes are spared in ageing in spite of poor component memory, and in doing so, 
highlight how these processes function. That is, they are both responsible for the 
simultaneous management of information, and potentially share a similar cognitive 
architecture (Figure 2). In the case of visual binding, different visual codes are brought 
together into a single, multimodal code in the episodic buffer. Attention is not necessary 
for this process. In the case of dual tasking, visual and verbal codes in their respective 
stores are handled simultaneously with the use of attention. That is to say, they are both 
responsible for the integration of separate streams of information to one point in time, 
and any effect of ageing appears to reflect the diminished memory for this information 






Figure 2: An interpretation of the cognitive architecture used in dual tasking and visual 
binding. Both processes combine simultaneous, but disparate, forms of information. 
 
The possibility of a common cognitive architecture is supported by both processes’ 
absence in DAT. The dual tasking impairment in DAT noted above deteriorates as the 
disease progresses (Baddeley, Bressi, Della Sala, Logie & Spinnler, 1991). In the case of 
visual binding, Parra et al. (2009b) observed that patients with DAT showed 
significantly lower binding memory for colours and objects than healthy elderly 
controls. Furthermore, this binding impairment was evident for preclinical patients of 
DAT (Parra et al., 2010a). Specifically, carriers of the E280A single presenilin-1 mutation 
(a mutation that leads to autosomic dominant familial Alzheimer’s disease in 100% of 
cases) evaded a diagnosis of DAT through neuropsychological assessment, but 
nonetheless showed a significantly poorer memory for bindings than controls, as did 
those who obtained a DAT diagnosis. 
 
However, there are other processes that are also lost in DAT but retained in ageing. How 
can it be claimed that dual tasking and visual binding share a common architecture that 
is distinct from that of other impairments in DAT, such as significant episodic memory 
loss? Here, it is important to refer to impairment specificity. That is, dual task and visual 
binding deficits are specific to DAT, whereas episodic memory loss is not. This indicates 
that there is a specific pathology in DAT that causes impairment of both of these 
processes. Other, non-specific impairments may reflect a different pathology that is 
shared in other disorders. Both dual tasking and visual binding have, in their respective 
literatures, been identified as fundamental markers of DAT.  
 
For instance, Parra, Abrahams, Logie and Della Sala (2010b) observed that the binding 
deficit in DAT is not seen in patients with depression. Similarly, and in the case of dual 
tasking, patients with depression are able to dual task, whereas those with DAT cannot 
(Kaschel et al., 2009). Importantly, the authors observed this disparity after matching 




with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) vary in dual task performance, causing no overall 
group impairment (unlike DAT, Foley et al., 2011). Although MCI implies a conversion to 
dementia (Petersen, 2004), it is a contentious diagnostic category that incurs a rate of 
false positives (14.1 – 23.1%, Brooks, Iverson, Holdnack & Feldman, 2008). The 
heterogeneity of the impairment observed in Foley et al. (2011) has been hypothesised 
to reflect that some MCI patients will have a pathology that is indicative of progression 
to DAT - and therefore a dual task impairment - whereas others will not progress to 
DAT, and therefore show no dual task impairment. Lastly, although TBI patients can 
demonstrate a dual task impairment (Azouvi et al., 2004), this is not a necessary 
consequence (Foley, Cantagallo, Della Sala & Logie, 2010). 
 
In sum, the retention of dual tasking and visual binding in ageing and the specific 
deterioration of these processes in DAT suggest that these processes may depend on the 
same cognitive architecture to function. That is, they both combine simultaneous codes 
of information; this requires effort in dual tasking, but not in visual binding.  
 
If these functions do depend on a similar cognitive architecture, then it stands to reason 
that the automaticity of binding can alleviate the executive cost of dual tasking. 
Specifically, if the simultaneous and different codes in a dual task can also be 
automatically bound into a single and stable entity, then there may be a reduced need 
for the executive resources usually required for dual tasking. This is because there will 
be no need to allocate or switch attention across stores, and the amount of information 
is effectively halved and stored in the episodic buffer. However, this effect will only be 
seen for hardwired bindings, as arbitrary bindings are easily overwritten.  
 
A dual tasking and visual binding paradigm 
The overall aim of this study was to test this prediction. Specifically, the major 
hypothesis is that the presence of hardwired bindings in a dual task should significantly 
alleviate the inevitable attentional demands of the dual task, and therefore improve dual 
task performance.  
 
In order for hardwired binding to occur, the information in the dual task must be 
relevant to visual information and should exist in the individual’s long term memory. 
The most intuitive solution is to use non-geometric objects and colours, since these co-
occur  to give stable semantic representations (Hocking & Price, 2008). Furthermore, 




therefore avoid introducing a processing bottleneck in visual working memory. 
Specifically, colour information can be presented aurally, and object information can be 
presented visually.  
 
How can colour and object information be presented to an individual in a dual task 
situation? The preloading paradigm used in MacPherson et al. (2007) is suitable for 
testing the primary hypothesis. First, a participant’s is assessed for their maximum level 
of component task performance; the rest of the paradigm is calibrated to this level (or 
“span”). Participants perform two component tasks independently at span. In the dual 
task situation, these tasks are presented together. Here, participants encode information 
for the primary (or preloading) task. After this, they perform the secondary (or 
concurrent) task, and finally recall primary task information. A participant’s 
performance in the dual task is compared to their performance when completing the 
tasks independently. This in turn can be used to calculate dual task cost. Specifically, 
cost represents the overall change in task proficiency or accuracy when two tasks are 
performed concurrently. Importantly, the cost is calculated with both single tasks in 
mind to capture any trade off that may exist (Della Sala et al., 2010).  This paradigm can 
therefore be used to assess a participant’s ability to remember colours and objects, and 
infer what cost is associated when these tasks are performed concurrently. The critical 
observation is whether objects and colours in the dual task significantly reduce dual 
task cost compared to a control dual task condition.  
 
The hypothesised process is as follows: after information in the preloading task and 
concurrent task is represented and held in working memory, the associated objects and 
colours should exist as stable bindings in the episodic buffer. As such, the individual’s 
memory for both the colours and objects should benefit from the presence of a stable 
bindings. In contrast, if there is no association or long term representation for the 
binding of colours and objects, then their binding will occur automatically, but will not 
persist in the dual task situation due to a lack of “backing” from long term memory. This 
provides a useful control dual task condition. 
 
Given that this paradigm assesses the interaction between working and long term 
memory, an additional aim was to explore if this beneficial effect was mediated by an 
individual’s hardwired bindings in long term memory. Specifically, it was also 
hypothesised that participants with more vivid bindings, or better access to bindings, 




appropriate. Indirect evidence for this comes from Hulme, Maughan and Brown (1991), 
who demonstrated that participants had a greater capacity for verbal information that 
was drawn from long term memory (i.e., English words) than for information that had 
no long term representations (e.g., non-words or words from a foreign language). As 
such, the present study was designed to also assess participants’ vividness, availability 
and semantic richness of visual bindings in long term memory.  
 
Before approaching these hypotheses, it was noted that there is no normative data for 
common colour-object associations, and therefore it was not clear what colours and 
objects may exist as hardwired bindings in long term memory. Although Hocking and 
Price (2008) reported objects that had a prototypical colour and those that did not, 
there was no justification or evidence for these associations. Rather than make such 
assumptions a priori, a pilot study was conducted to investigate which objects have a 





Assessing colour-object associations 
 
Method 
Participants. 20 undergraduate students from the University of Edinburgh 
participated in this study, and received academic credit for participating.  
 
Materials and Apparatus. 515 black and white pictures of common objects were 
taken from the International Picture Naming Project (IPNP: Bates et al., 2000). For each 
object, the IPNP includes normative data representing the mean reaction time to 
produce its predominant name, the number of responses where its predominant name is 
given, and the number of alternative names that have been assigned to it. A list of 11 
common colours was created and is given in the Appendix. E-Studio was used to create 
the computer program that presented the colours and objects and collected participant’s 
responses. E-Run was used to run the experiment on a personal computer. 
 
Procedure and Design. Participants were read instructions before the experiment 
began. Participants viewed each of the objects with the list of colours. For each object, 
they were asked to select a colour that they felt was associated with the object. If the 
participant felt that no colour was associated with the object, they were asked to select a 
“no typical” response. Participants responded by clicking on the colour with the mouse, 
and then saw the next object. The experiment continued in this way until the participant 
responded to the last object. All participants viewed the same list of colours and saw the 
same objects, once, in the same order. The experiment was approved by the University 
of Edinburgh Psychology Research Ethics Committee.  
 
Results 
Frequencies of colour assignment were viewed for each object. An instance where an 
object had a single colour associated with it for ≥ 80% of the total responses was defined 
as a typical colour-object association. This gave 121 objects with a colour that was 
typically associated to them (“typical objects”), and 394 objects that did not have a 
typical colour (“control objects”). For instance, a ghost constituted as a typical object, as 
80% or more of the participants associated it with the colour white. Conversely, a pirate 





The pilot experiment produced a set of materials that could be defined as having a 
reliable association between them, which could in turn be used in a dual task situation 







48 students from the University of Edinburgh participated in this study and earned £6 
per hour for participating. 
 
Procedure and Design 
Participants gave consent and heard an overview of the whole procedure from the 
experimenter. At the start of a new task, the experimenter gave brief instructions to the 
participant, who then read instructions given on screen. The tasks began when the 
participant was prepared and informed. To begin, participants completed memory tasks 
in the following order: immediate colour span, immediate object span, delayed colour 
span, delayed object span, colour single task, object single task, and the dual task. These 
tasks are described below and their general procedures are illustrated in Figures 3-5. 
  
Colour span. Participants heard colours spoken in a list through headphones for 
(number of colours * 1) seconds. When the list finished, participants had to repeat all the 
colours in the order they had heard them back to the experimenter. A participant passed 
if they correctly recalled all colours in the correct order. The next list was presented 
after participants gave their response. Participant initially heard three lists containing 
two colours. If they correctly recalled at least two out of three lists, they heard three 
more lists containing three colours. The test iterated in this way until participants either 
failed to correctly recall at least two lists of colours or reached the upper boundary of 
ten colours in a list. The maximum number of colours at which they could correctly 
recall at least two of the three lists in order was taken as their colour span. Immediate 
span tasks did not contain a delay between presentation and testing. Delayed span tasks 
contained a delay of (immediate object span * 2) seconds.  
 
Object span. Participants saw objects presented on a computer monitor for 
(number of objects * 1) seconds. After the presentation, a test array appeared which 
contained the objects presented before and an equal number of distracter items. 
Participants had to click on the objects they had seen before. Participants passed if they 
correctly clicked all the target objects. The next array was presented after participants 
gave their response.  The iteration conditions, calculation of span and timings of 





Figure 3: The general span test procedure. 
 
Single tasks. This test was designed to assess a participant’s immediate and 
delayed memory for a set number of colours or objects. In each instance, their 
immediate object span defined the number of items they had to remember. Like span 
trials, items were presented for (number of items * 1) seconds. Objects and colours were 
presented as they were in the span task. In the test phase, participants had (number of 
items * 1) seconds to recall the items.  Object memory was tested as it was in the span 
task. Colour memory was assessed differently; the number of correctly called colours 
was recorded, and participants could recall these in any order.   
 
Trials with no delay between item presentation and recall were used to assess 
immediate memory. Trials with a delay of (immediate object span * 2) seconds between 
item presentation and recall were used to assess delayed memory.  
 
 
Figure 4: The single task procedure. 
 
Test for dual task performance. To start, participants observed a set of items. This 
was the start of the preload task. The participant’s immediate object span defined the 
number of items, and participants observed the items for (number of items * 1) seconds. 
Immediately after this, participants observed a second set of items. This was the start of 
the interpolated task. The number of items and presentation duration were the same as 




interpolated task items in under (number of items * 1) seconds. Lastly, and immediately 
after this, participants recalled preload task items in under (number of items * 1). The 
presentation and assessment for colours and objects were the same as the single task.  
 
“Typical” dual tasks used typical objects and their associated colours. There were two 
types of control dual tasks. Type 1 presented control objects with random colours. Type 
2 presented typical objects with colours that were not typically assigned to them.    
 
Figure 5: The dual task procedure. 
 
After these tasks were performed, participants completed four questionnaires. These 
were the Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS, Reisberg, Pearson & Kosslyn, 2003), 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ, Marks, 1973), scale of semantic 
strength (SSS; Parra, Spelling, Kuske, Della Sala & Logie, in preparation) and a debriefing 
questionnaire. Copies of these questionnaires can be found in the Appendix. The 
debriefing questionnaire was always administered immediately after the dual task. 
 
The procedure took roughly 50 minutes to complete, but the duration varied with 
respect to the participant’s immediate object span; it defined the duration of the delayed 
span, single and dual tasks. 
 
Participants completed colour single task trials as two blocks of four trials; one block of 
immediate trials, and one of delayed trials. The immediate block always occurred first. 
Participants completed 16 object single task trials as four blocks of four trials; two 
blocks of typical objects, and two of control objects.  For each of these two blocks, one 
contained immediate trials, and the other contained delayed trials, and the immediate 
block always occurred first. The dual tasks were presented in two parts, where each part 
contained two blocks of two trials. One part contained the typical materials, and the 
other contained control materials. In each part, one block contained two trials where the 




the preload task. Within the control part, each block contained one Type 1 trial and one 
Type 2 trial.  
 
A within-participants design was used. The order of typical and control conditions and 
trials was counterbalanced across every two participants to negate any potential 
practice effects for object single and dual tasks. Additionally, the order of dual task 
information was counterbalanced across participants. The experiment was approved by 
the University of Edinburgh Psychology Research Ethics Committee.  
 
Materials and Apparatus 
E-Studio was used to create a computer program that presented all relevant memory 
tests in one session. E-Run was used to run the computer program on a personal 
computer, and standard headphones were used to hear the colour names. Participants 
made responses to objects with the mouse. The questionnaires were in paper form.  
 
The stimuli used in the memory tests were the same objects and colours used in the 
pilot study. To avoid any effect of object frequency in object recognition, control and 
typical objects presented in the experiment (either as targets or distracters) were 
chosen to have comparable naming frequencies (Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1: Mean Object Nameability Across Typical and Control Single and Dual Tasks.  
 Single Task Dual Task 
Typical Control Typical Control 
Target Object 84 86 90 85 





Results and Analysis 
 
The analysis employed both quantitative and qualitative approaches to participants’ 
dual task performance. The first three sections detail the quantitative analysis. First, 
measurements of single and dual task accuracy were analysed across all experimental 
permeations. Next, the variable of dual cost was calculated and analysed across all 
conditions of the dual task. Finally, by adopting an individual differences approach, the 
beneficial effect of a typical dual task condition was analysed using multivariate 
regression, using participants’ spans and questionnaire scores as predictor variables. 
 
The remaining sections detail the qualitative analysis of participants’ approach to the 
dual task. The first section is a discussion of the specific comments participants had 
about their perception of the dual task and any strategies they may have used. The final 
section demonstrates which broad characteristics define participants who did or did not 
benefit from the presence of hardwired bindings.   
 
Single and dual task accuracy 
The dependent variables of task accuracy were calculated as the mean percentage of 
colours and objects correctly remembered in typical and control dual and single task1 
situations. This produced eight (2 x 2 x 2) accuracy variables for each participant.  
 
Two two-way within-participants ANOVAs were conducted to test the effects of 
condition (typical or control) and feature (object or colour) on accuracy in single and 
dual tasks.  
 
The first ANOVA revealed that there was no significant effect of condition or feature on 
single task accuracy. No significant interaction was found. The second ANOVA revealed 
that there was a significant effect of feature on dual task accuracy (F (1, 47) = 17.563, p < 
0.001; η2 = 0.272), but there was no significant effect of condition. No significant 
interaction was found. This demonstrated that participants had significantly greater 
accuracy for colours, but did not differ in accuracy across the typical and control 
conditions. This is represented in Figure 6. 
 
                                               
1 Preliminary analysis showed that the order of dual task information (i.e., colour-to-object vs. 
object-to-colour) did not reveal any significant difference in dual task accuracy. As such, the 




Dual task cost 
The independent variable of dual task cost was calculated from measures of accuracy 










accuracytask  Dualaccuracytask  Single
*100task  dual of Cost  
 
This produced four (condition x feature) cost variables for each participant. A two-way 
within-participant ANOVA revealed an effect of feature on dual task cost (F (1, 47) = 
7.7365, p < 0.01; η2 = 0.141), but there was no significant effect of condition. This 
demonstrated that participants showed significantly lower cost for colours and no 
difference in cost across typical and control conditions. This is represented in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 6: Rates of average object and 
colour accuracy across control (red) 
and typical (blue) dual task conditions.  
Figure 7: Dual task costs for object and 
colour memory across control (red) and 
typical (blue) dual task conditions
 
In sum, there was no significant difference between dual task cost and accuracy when 
objects and colours were related and when they were not. However, as noted in the 
secondary set of hypotheses, the degree to which these associations are used or 









A new variable was created to investigate the potential individual differences in the 
benefit drawn from the presence of hardwired bindings. This variable was calculated as 
the difference in cost a participant experienced in the control and typical dual task 
situations: 
 
(Average control condition cost) – (Average typical condition cost) 
 
This variable is referred to as a participant’s “association benefit”. A positive value 
indicated that a participant experienced a smaller dual task cost when an association 
existed between the objects and colours. Figure 8 illustrates that this variable is centred 
on zero and approximates a normal frequency distribution. An individual differences 
analysis with multiple regression models was conducted to investigate the causes of this 
variance. Here, participants’ spans and questionnaire responses are used as predictor 




Figure 8: The distribution of association benefit scores across participants. A positive 









Table 2: Descriptive statistics of participants’ average spans and questionnaire scores 
 Mean (SD) Range 
Spans 
Colour   
   Immediate 5.25 (0.83) 3 – 7 
   Delayed 5.38 (0.91) 3 – 7 
   
Object   
   Immediate 6.52 (1.17) 4 – 9 
   Delayed 7.56 (1.24) 4 – 9  
   
Questionnaires 
SUIS 40.42 (6.19) 23 – 54 
VVIQ 62.19 (9.36) 34 – 79 
SS 44.31 (8.66) 21 – 58  
 
The best fitting linear model of association benefit demonstrated a significant effect of 
average colour span (β = -5.1725, standard error = 1.7512, p < 0.01) and scores on the 
VVIQ (β = 0.3098, standard error = 0.1452, p < 0.05). Whilst an interaction effect was 
observed at borderline significance, its inclusion did not significantly improve model fit. 
This suggests the effects are additive. No significant effects of accuracy, average object 
span or other questionnaire measures were seen, and their inclusion in the final model 
did not improve fit. The best fitting model explained 19% (Adjusted R2 = 0.19) of the 
variance in association benefit. Correlation analysis demonstrated that the effect of 
colour span is significantly negative (r = -0.38, p < 0.01), and the effect of visual 
vividness is positive (r = 0.27, p = 0.6). This implies that participants with lower colour 
spans and/or higher scores of visual vividness experience a lower cost in the typical 
dual task condition than in the control dual task condition. In sum, the benefit received 
from the association of colours and objects varies according to an individual’s colour 
span and visual vividness.  
 
Quantitative analysis explained which participants were likely to benefit from a typical 
dual task situation. However, it could not indicate whether these participants detected 
or exploited the association between colours and objects. An investigation of 
participants’ responses in the debriefing questionnaires demonstrated how they 
approached the dual task scenario and whether they used or noticed the associations 
between colours and objects. Similarly, because participants were divided on whether 





analysis was to understand whether there were any group-level characteristics that 
defined participants who do (and do not) experience an association benefit.  
 
For the purposes of the following analysis, the participants’ responses to the debriefing 
questionnaire were investigated to determine a) what strategies the participants had 
used throughout the experiment and b) whether they had noticed any connection 
between the colours and objects.  
 
Individual approaches to the dual task 
Of the 48 participants that completed the experiment, only three reported any 
connection between objects and colours in the dual task (P1, P11, P37). Of these three, 
only one demonstrated a reduced cost in the typical dual task relative to the control dual 
task (P37).  
 
Across the dual task conditions, only five participants considered explicitly associating 
colours and objects together as a strategy (P30, P37, P38, P47, P48). However, only one 
noted that this was a beneficial strategy (P37). This participant also demonstrated a 
smaller cost in the typical dual task situation. All other participants commented that a 
focus on the associations would impair memory for the colours and objects themselves.  
It should also be noted that these participants were the only participants who explicitly 
stated any potential cross-task strategy; the remainder of the participants were more 
concerned with focusing on the two tasks individually. Furthermore, no participants 
stated that they would attempt a better dual task strategy if they had to repeat the task 
again. 
 
In sum, noticing the association between colours and objects does not entail an 
association benefit. Similarly, the presence of an association benefit usually occurs 
without the participant explicitly associating the colours and objects, which in turn is 
seen as a costly, attention-demanding strategy. Lastly, the evidence that most 
participants approached and commented on the dual task as two component tasks 




Participants who scored an association benefit greater than zero were placed in the 





presence of associated colours and objects. All other participants were placed in the “no 
benefit” group, as they experienced a cost in the typical condition that was equal to or 
larger than the cost in the control condition. This suggests that the presence of 
associated objects and colours did not improve their dual task performance. This group 
classification placed exactly half (n = 24) of the participants in the benefit group, and the 
other half in the no benefit group. Importantly, this division did not reflect the order in 
which dual task conditions were completed (e.g., typical condition first), and is therefore 
not due to a practice effect.  
 
There was no significant difference between the groups’ average object span, colour 
span, VVIQ, SUIS or SS scores. As such, the different frequency of strategies was 
investigated for each group. 
 
These responses were given freely, and then categorised into strategies as follows: a) 
association, where colours or objects are semantically grouped together (e.g., objects 
that are animals, primary colours, etc.); b) chunking, where grouping objects or colours 
with no semantic basis (e.g., the first three colours in a list, objects presented close 
together); c) rehearsal, which involves repetition of colour and object names; d) 
visualisation, which is a colours only strategy where participants imagine the colours on 
a spectrum or wheel; e) story, which is an object only strategy, where participants 
generate an ad-hoc sequence to tie all objects together into a single string of information 
(e.g., “the hippopotamus sat on the chair, eating a cherry…”); f) combinations, which 
entails the use of multiple strategies; g) and no strategy. 
 
The frequencies of these strategies across the groups are represented in Figures 9 and 
10. Most noticeably, the benefit group demonstrated rehearsal as a strategy for colour 
memory more often than the no benefit group and also more often than other strategies. 
Conversely, the no benefit group appears to use combinations of strategies to remember 
colours more than the benefit group. The most noticeable difference in object strategies 
used by both groups is that only no benefit participants use chunking to help remember 
objects. The distribution of colour strategies in the benefit group was the only 
distribution that was significantly different from the normal distribution (χ2 (5) = 17.5, p 
< 0.01). This indicates that the use of rehearsal as a strategy is a significant 






In sum, participants who demonstrate an association benefit were also those who 
reported using rehearsal to remember colours.  
 
 
Figure 9: The distribution of 
strategies used by the benefit 
group (blue) and the no benefit 
group (red) when remembering 
colours.  
Figure 10: The distribution of 
strategies used by the benefit group 
(blue) and the no benefit group 







The main aim of this study was to investigate a potential relationship between dual 
tasking and visual binding. Here, the primary hypothesis was that a dual task that 
involved colours and objects that exist as hardwired bindings would significantly 
alleviate the executive demands required to dual task. In turn, this reduced need for 
executive demands would make the dual task easier, and therefore introduce a smaller 
dual task cost. Given that this manipulation involved the use of representations stored in 
long term memory, a secondary, open hypothesis was that the effect would vary 
according to an individual’s access to and quality of such colour and object bindings in 
long term memory.  
 
There was no significant difference in dual task accuracy or cost between the typical and 
control dual task condition. Whilst this would appear to counter the primary hypothesis, 
the difference in cost between these conditions, labelled the association benefit, varied 
across participants (Figure 8). This suggested that some – but not all - participants 
showed better dual task performance in a condition where objects and colours were 
associated. This variance presumably prevented the overall difference in cost between 
the dual task conditions from reaching statistical significance.  Importantly, this 
difference in association benefit is not an artefact of counterbalancing; if all participants 
who scored a positive association benefit also completed the typical dual task last, it 
would be clear that the association benefit would simply reflect a practice effect. An 
individual differences analysis outlined some causes of this variance, and revealed that 
the association benefit was significantly predicted by a participant’s VVIQ score and 
average colour (verbal) span, suggesting that its variance does not reflect a chance 
distribution. In sum, the analysis revealed that dual task cost can be reduced when 
colours and objects existed as bindings in long term memory, but this effect was 
sensitive to individual differences, including the individual’s long term memory 
representations. As such, both of the experimental hypotheses are partially supported.  
 
Visual binding and dual tasking 
The central question for this discussion is: what does the association benefit represent? 
The experimental hypotheses were designed to demonstrate a relationship between 
dual tasking and visual binding. As such, it is imperative to understand if the association 





caused the reduction in cost. Specifically, the association benefit seen here can be 
interpreted in two ways.  
 
The first interpretation is that the difference in cost is due to the successful integration 
of information. Here, associated colours and objects are bound and held in the episodic 
buffer. As such, the amount of information is effectively halved, therefore improving 
performance in contrast to the control dual task; technically, participants are 
performing a task at less than span level, since they are retaining a smaller number of 
items in working memory. The second interpretation is that the difference in cost is due 
to the increased availability of information through priming. Here, the change in dual 
task cost is due to the increased activation of one set of information as another set is 
attended to. As such, the process of retrieval is facilitated, as is commonly seen in 
priming studies of related lexical items (e.g., Neely, 1977). These interpretations 
implicate different areas of the brain and cognitive systems. As reviewed by Parra et al. 
(2009b), learned associations imply the medial temporal lobes and hippocampus, 
whereas binding reflects an interaction of disparate cortical areas and can occur without 
the hippocampus (Baddeley, Allen & Hitch, 2011).  
 
Therefore, if the association benefit is driven by binding in short term memory, then the 
study’s assumption of a shared cognitive architecture between dual tasking and visual 
binding is valid. However, this claim cannot be made if the effect is simply due to 
associative priming, as this reflects spreading activation rather than binding in working 
memory. As such, it is critical that the cause of the association benefit is correctly 
understood before any strong conclusions regarding visual binding and dual tasking are 
made. Unfortunately, the data do not help delineate the nature of the association benefit.  
 
Firstly, responses taken from the debriefing questionnaire imply that the association 
benefit could reflect both processes. On one hand, the majority of participants who 
demonstrated an association benefit did so without explicitly noting any association 
between colours or objects or exploiting said association to improve dual task 
performance. This in turn implies that binding did not drive these participants’ 
association benefit, because retrieval of information from the episodic buffer is 
theorised to depend on conscious awareness. However, the response of one participant 
indicated that they noticed and consciously exploited the colour-object associations to 
help improve dual task performance. Accordingly, they demonstrated an association 





to aid dual task performance, but the insight to this participant’s process is only as deep 
as their questionnaire response, and consequently cannot be argued that this strictly 
reflects binding.  
 
Secondly, individual differences analysis of the association benefit suggests that it 
represents a binding process. Specifically, the positive effect of VVIQ on association 
benefit implies that the reduction of cost in the typical dual task situation depends on 
the participant’s ability to bind visual information, as the recall of complex imagery and 
episodes is dependent on access to multimodal information held and produced in the 
episodic buffer (see Baddeley, 2000). Furthermore, the evidence that SUIS scores did not 
significantly predict changes in the association benefit demonstrates that the reduction 
in cost is not dependent on the ease at which complex imagery comes to mind; this 
argues against the priming interpretation of the association benefit. 
 
In sum, the data present an unclear interpretation of what the association benefit 
represents. At this point, it is clear that, whilst the benefit has been observed with the 
current paradigm, strong implications regarding the shared architecture of dual tasking 
and visual binding cannot be made at this time. However, the ambiguity that restricts 
progress here can be resolved with further research. Specifically, the same paradigm 
used here can be modified to identify what process causes the association benefit to 
occur.  
 
The first modification would be to introduce different levels of dual task difficulty, as 
indexed by the number of items in a dual task above or below an individual’s span. If the 
effect observed here is due to the binding of information, then participants who 
demonstrate an association benefit should demonstrate a comparable benefit for typical 
dual tasks that present items at up to twice their span level. However, if association is 
the main cause of the benefit, then there should be a linear relationship between 
difficulty and association benefit. Here, whilst participants’ responses would be 
facilitated, they will still be performing above span level, and demonstrate greater task 
cost as a result.  
 
The second modification would measure the latencies of participant’s responses. If 
participants’ recall for items is faster in the typical condition in contrast to a control dual 
task, this could arguably reflect the facilitating effect caused by associative priming. 





effect here is presumably because this study’s observations were based on the end state 
of the process (i.e., accuracy) rather than the speed at which this process was carried 
out.  
 
In summary, further research using a modified version of this study’s paradigm will 
explain whether the association benefit is due to integration through binding in working 
memory, or strengthened activation through priming and associative long term 
memory, or both. If binding is the cause for reduced dual task cost, it can be argued that 
these processes share a similar cognitive architecture, and implications regarding the 
specific pathology in DAT can be discussed at that time. 
 
So far the data have been discussed with respect to the experimental aims and the 
broader theoretical issue of dual tasking and visual binding’s relationship. Nonetheless, 
analysis of the data yielded some important, but unexpected effects that can reduce dual 
task cost. Specifically, participants who have low span and use rehearsal in the typical 
dual task condition in a dual task cost tended to show lower dual task cost. Furthermore, 
participants demonstrated lower dual task cost for tasks that used colours in contrast to 
objects. Since these effects are unexpected - and therefore given post hoc explanations - 
they cannot be used to explain the nature of association benefit, and cannot be used to 
confirm or disprove the assumed relationship between dual tasking and visual binding.  
However, these findings merit some discussion, as they introduce possible ways to 
reduce dual task cost, and can potentially aid dual task performance or rehabilitation 
(e.g., Schwenk, Zieschang, Oster & Hauer, 2010). Accordingly, the effects that have 
reduced dual task cost are now discussed here to better understand why this may have 
occurred, and to understand whether these effects can form the basis of efficient dual 
task strategies.  
 
Reducing dual task cost 
Without understanding the exact cause of the association benefit, the data suggest that 
dual task performance can be improved if the component tasks contain associations that 
are held in long term memory. Essentially, this finding mirrors previous evidence that 
memory for verbal information is improved when said information matches 
representations in long term memory (Hulme, Maughan & Brown, 1991). However, the 
effect’s sensitivity to individual differences in this study implies that simply using 
associated information in a dual task will not necessarily reduce cost. Overall, though, 





that the strategy may be appropriate if the necessary long term representations are 
intact.   
 
The negative relationship between span and dual task cost in the typical condition can 
be interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation presupposes that participants with 
high spans approach the dual task in a different way to low span participants. Here, 
participants with a high colour span may be more likely to verbalise information in 
working memory. As such colours and objects are likely to be stored in the phonological 
loop (as seen in Parra, Della Sala, Logie & Abrahams, 2009a) and not distributed across 
both stores (see Figure 1). As such, the participant is likely to introduce a processing 
bottleneck (Duncan, Martens & Ward, 1997) and dual task performance as a whole 
decreases as component tasks are processed serially. By implication, participants with a 
low verbal span are less likely to burden the phonological loop, and divide visual and 
verbal information across the stores accordingly. In doing so, low span participants can 
avoid the bottleneck and keep both forms of information in working memory, allowing 
the association benefit to take place.  
The second interpretation is based on a study of proactive interference (PI, Kane & 
Engle, 2000). Here, participants were asked to remember and recall four different lists 
of items. High span participants were able to avoid interfering information presented in 
other lists. By contrast, participants with low verbal spans were more likely to 
incorrectly recall information from the other list. However, this difference between 
groups was removed when attention was distracted; high span participants 
demonstrated a larger PI effect, but the effect did not change for low span participants. 
Participants with higher span were theorised to have access to more executive 
resources that could be used to separate information effectively; low span participants 
were thought to lack these resources. Furthermore, Osaka, Nishizaki, Komori and Osaka 
(2002) argue that, in cases of PI, participants with low span are specifically impaired in 
their ability to inhibit information they have previously focused on. For the present 
study, it could be argued that low span participants could not dedicate resources to help 
segregate colours and objects they have attended to, which could ostensibly increase the 
chance of the association benefit occurring through binding or associative priming. It is 
important to note that this posited effect is distinct from simply being able to cross tasks 
together; if this were the case, low span participants would simply be better at dual 






At present, it is neither possible to conclude which of the two interpretations is more 
appropriate, nor to state if they are mutually exclusive. However, these interpretations 
lead to testable predictions. If this effect of span on association benefit reflects a 
bottleneck, then participants who demonstrate an association benefit should no longer 
show the benefit if they are made to verbalise all items in the dual task. In the case that 
the effect of span represents interference, then participants who demonstrate an 
association benefit should also be likely to make more source errors in recognition tests 
for items in the component tasks.  
 
The evidence those who benefited from typical colour-object associations used 
rehearsal as a strategy for colour tasks may be a reflection of the low span participants 
in the group. That is, participants with low span appear to benefit from rehearsal 
strategies more than high span individuals (Turley-Ames & Whitfield, 2003). As such, 
the evidence that rehearsal is a “trademark” of participants who show an association 
benefit may in fact reflect low span participants who adopted rehearsal as a strategy and 
maintained it when it was found to be effective. It is therefore unclear if the effect of 
rehearsal is spurious, but can nonetheless be tested. If the use of rehearsal is a 
significant cause of reducing cost in a typical dual task situation, then all participants 
would presumably demonstrate an association benefit if they were instructed to use 
rehearsal as their only strategy. If this were the case, the implications of such an effect 
could be discussed at that time.     
 
Lastly, the significantly lower dual task cost for colours, at face value, appears to 
demonstrate that dual tasking with verbal information is easier. However, the effect 
outlined in the analysis may be an artefact of experimental design. Specifically, 
participants at the dual task stage may have become aware of the colours used, as only 
11 colours were used throughout the procedure, whereas 515 different objects were 
used. As such, memory for colours in the dual task may be aided by a practice or 
familiarity effect. Alternatively, it is possible that participants found the object 
recognition harder than the colour recall; the former required fast movements with the 
mouse. This potential confound could be resolved using a simple yes/no recognition 
test, where test objects are presented serially and only after a response is given. As such, 
the feature effect is most likely to reflect an artefact of method, and is unlikely to have a 






In summary, the effect of condition – as mediated by span and long term memory 
representations – on dual task cost can be explored further to understand whether dual 
task cost can be reduced through particular strategies and approached. However, it may 
be that these strategies are not applicable to all individuals.  
 
Conclusions 
This study applied a new dual task paradigm to understand whether dual task 
performance can be improved by using information that could be bound in working 
memory.  Although dual task performance could be improved by using colour-object 
associations, this effect – the association benefit – is more sensitive to individual 
differences than predicted and unclear in nature. As such, these findings alone cannot 
refute or confirm the larger question and assumption that visual binding and dual 
tasking share a cognitive architecture. In spite of this ambiguity, the presence of the 
association benefit, and the conditions under which it can occur, raise important 
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What strategy did you use? 
1. Did you use only one strategy throughout? If more, explain. 
2. Did you notice any connection between stimuli (e.g., colours and objects)? If so, explain. 
3. Did you find any task easier than other tasks? If so, explain. 
4. Did you find any sets of stimuli more difficult to remember than other? If so, explain. 
5. If you had to perform this task again, would you do it differently? If so, explain. 





Spontaneous Use of Imagery Questionnaire (SUIS; Reisberg, Pearson & Kosslyn, 2003) 
 
Please read each of the following descriptions and indicate the degree to which each is 
appropriate for you. Do not spend a lot of time thinking about each one, but respond based on 
your thoughts about how you do or do not perform each activity. If a description is always-
completely appropriate, please choose “5”; if it is never appropriate, choose “1”; if it is 
appropriate about half of the time, choose “3”; and use the other numbers accordingly. 
   
  















When going to a new place, I prefer directions that include 
detailed descriptions of landmarks (such as the size, shape and 
colour of a gas station) in addition to their names  
1  2  3  4  5 
2 
If I catch a glance of a car that is partially hidden behind bushes, I 
automatically "complete it", seeing the entire car in my mind's 
eye.  
1  2  3  4  5 
3 
If I am looking for new furniture in a store, I always visualise 
what the furniture would look like in particular places in my 
home.  
1  2  3  4  5 
4 
I prefer to read novels that lead me easily to visualise where the 
characters are and what they are doing instead of novels that are 
difficult to visualise.  
1  2  3  4  5 
5 
When I think about visiting a relative, I almost always have a 
clear mental picture of him or her.  
1  2  3  4  5 
6 
When relatively easy technical material is described clearly in a 
text, I find illustrations distracting because they interfere with 
my ability to visualize the material.  
1  2  3  4  5 
7 
If someone were to tell me two-digit numbers to add (e.g. 24 and 
31), I would visualize them in order to add them.  
1  2  3  4  5 
8 
Before I get dressed to go out, I first visualize what I will look like 
if I wear different combinations of clothes.  
1  2  3  4  5 
9 
When I think about a series of errands I must do, I visualise the 
stores I will visit.  
1  2  3  4  5 
10 
When I first hear a friend's voice, a visual image of him or her 
almost always springs to mind.  
1  2  3  4  5 
11 
When I hear a radio announcer or DJ I've never actually seen, I 
usually find myself picturing what they might look like.  
1  2  3  4  5 
12 
If I saw a car accident, I would visualize what had happened 
when later trying to recall the details.  










1. The exact contour of face, head, shoulders and body. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the person  
 
2. Characteristic poses of head, attitudes of body, etc. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the person  
 
3. The precise carriage, length of step, etc., in walking. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the person  
 
4. The different colours worn in some familiar clothes. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the person  
 
2. Visualize a rising sun. Consider carefully the picture that comes before your 
mind's eye.  
 
5. The sun is rising above the horizon into a hazy sky. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the scene  
 
 
6. The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
1. For items 1-4, think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see (but 
who is not with you at present) and consider carefully the picture that comes 





  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the scene  
 
7. Clouds. A storm blows up, with flashes of lightning. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the scene  
 
8. A rainbow appears. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the scene  
 
3. Think of the front of a shop which you often go to. Consider the picture that 
comes before your mind's eye.  
 
9. The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite side of the road. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the scene  
 
10. A window display including colours, shapes and details of individual items for sale.  
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the scene  
 
11. You are near the entrance. The colour, shape and details of the door. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the scene  
 
12. You enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter assistant serves you. Money changes 
hands.  
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  






4. Finally, think of a country scene which involves trees, mountains and a lake. 
Consider the picture that comes before your mind's eye.  
 
13. The contours of the landscape. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the scene  
 
14. The colour and shape of the trees. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the scene  
 
15. The colour and shape of the lake.  
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  
  1. No image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the scene  
 
16. A Strong wind blows on the trees and on the lake causing waves. 
Choose one of the following answers 
  5. Perfectly clear and lively as real as seeing  
  4. Clear and lively  
  3. Moderately clear and lively  
  2. Dim and vague; flat  





Scale of Semantic Strength (SSS; Parra, Spilling, Kuske, Della Sala & Logie, unsubmitted) 
 
Please write beside each figure the name you think best describe each of them. If you can not 













































































Participants’ responses were compared against mode responses for the items in the 
questionnaires. The number of matching/agreeing responses was divided by the number of 
items to give a percentage that acted as the participant’s semantic strength. 
 
